Friday, November 22, 2024

Passive investing, advantage and market efficiency: winners need losers

A A couple of years ago I wrote about market efficiency and investment benefits – and so they don’t exist.

But let’s take a more in-depth have a look at why that is so.

We often hear from private and skilled investors that passive (or index) investing makes the markets less efficient.

Their argument is that this inefficiency justifies energetic management.

Well, they’re mistaken – but not in the best way you may think. The reality is more nuanced.

Let’s do just a little math to clarify how passive investing actually makes life harder, not easier, for energetic managers.

Model market: Alice, Bob and Clifton

Imagine a market with two stocks, XLT and YPR, and three investors: Alice, Bob and Clifton.

The total market capitalization is $1,000.

Together, Alice, Bob and Clifton own portfolios price $1,000.

There are not any other corporations and no other investors – we keep things easy – however the the explanation why this model is “wrong” don’t really matter for today’s situation.

Alice and Bob each hold $300, while Clifton has $400.

XLT and YPR each have 100 shares outstanding, with XLT priced at $6 per share and YPR priced at $4 per share.

(Yes, that is beginning to sound like GCSE maths, but hang in there.)

In other words:

Now Alice, Bob and Clifton all hold market-weighted portfolios. This makes them passive investors by default.

Ideologically, nevertheless, Clifton is a classic index fund investor – passive through and thru.

Alice and Bob, then again, are energetic traders. They are willing to take a risk in the event that they sense a bonus.

This market is subsequently 40% passive (Clifton) and 60% energetic (Alice and Bob).

Stupid passive money?

A typical misconception is that passive investors blindly “buy expensive stocks” when prices rise.

Let us debunk this myth with an example.

XLT posts great results before the market opens and Alice is optimistic. She calls Bob to purchase a few of his XLT shares, knowing full well that Clifton – the passive guy – principally doesn’t trade. (Clifton doesn’t even hassle to go to the office before noon!)

This is how their conversation goes:

Ring, ring…

  • Alice:
  • Bob:
  • Alice:
  • Bob:
  • Alice:
  • Bob:

When Clifton finally arrives on the office – sometime after his tennis match and an extended lunch on the club – he logs into his Quotron and sees that XLT is up 33% to $8.00.

One headline reads:.

Satisfied together with his morning “work,” Clifton updates his portfolio to reflect the brand new prices.

So note that nobody traded in any respect here. Alice and Bob just agreed that $8 was a good price for XLT, and Clifton agreed on their behalf.

This is how most price movements on the stock market occur. You haven’t got to trade to maneuver prices.

The Alpha Hunt

A couple of weeks later, Alice gets inside details about XLT – for instance during a friendly round of golf with the CEO. The company is on the verge of landing a serious government contract.

Alice tries again to purchase something from Bob, who suspects something fishy is happening. He agrees to sell her some XLT shares, but at a good higher price, $10 per share.

Since it is a closed system, Alice has to sell YPR to boost the cash to purchase XLT. And guess who she has to sell it to? Bob. They comply with swap their shares.

Alice has now staked every thing on XLT, while Bob holds more YPR. (For simplicity, we ignore that Bob would likely demand a reduction on the YPR he buys, in addition to a premium on the XLT he sells – Alice’s “market leverage”).

Here is a standing check:

And here’s the kicker: In order for Alice to chubby XLT, Bob has to underweight it. Clifton, the passive investor, doesn’t change his positions in any respect.

This is a zero-sum game. Every dollar of “active share” held by Alice have to be balanced by Bob’s:

None of this has modified the relative value of their portfolios – but it can.

When XLT rises 50% attributable to the contract announcement, Alice makes a profit of $60.

But Bob? His loss is the precise mirror image of Alice’s gain:

Since anyone can easily buy the market, outperformance is what matters for energetic investors.

Alice’s outperformance (also often called alpha or profit) of $60 is strictly offset by Bob’s underperformance of $60.

Bob still made money, but lower than if he had maintained his market weight.

I do know I’m making the identical argument over and once more, nevertheless it’s necessary: Alice can only get her $60 alpha at Bob’s expense.

The winner needs the loser.

Increasing passive share

Imagine that Clifton, our passive investor, controls a bigger portion of the market than before.

Let’s say the market has shifted in order that Clifton now owns $600 of the whole $1,000.

Meanwhile, Bob only has to administer $100, while Alice’s capital stays unchanged at $300.

Passive market share has increased from 40% to 60%. Let’s revisit the primary conversation between Alice and Bob that caused the worth of XLT to rise to $8 to see where it takes us.

Ring, ring…

So far, nothing changes. But when Alice returns from golf with the CEO of XLT and tries to purchase more shares, things get more complicated.

Bob doesn’t have enough shares to sell her all of the ones she wants. Now Bob has only ten shares of XLT at $10 each, for a complete of $100.

Alice has $120 price of YPR to sell, but cannot buy as much XLT as she would love:

While passive investors like Clifton are gaining increasingly market share, Alice’s strategy hits a wall. She cannot fully bet on her insider tip because there aren’t enough energetic participants to trade with.

And that is a giant problem for her alpha.

Let’s see how this affects everyone’s alpha in comparison with our previous example with a passive market share of 40%:

Things have gotten worse for everybody except Clifton!

  • Alice’s alpha has decreased.
  • Bob’s negative alpha relative to his capital is now even worse.
  • Clifton doesn’t care.

The passive vicious loop

Let’s imagine that Alice keeps getting lucky – or getting inside information – and Bob consistently underperforms.

At some point, a few of Bob’s investors will return their money. They are die-hard believers within the pursuit of outperformance and would love to go away it to Alice – but they can not.

Why not? Because Alice’s strategy is capacity-constrained.

Alice can only earn cash if she will be able to trade against another person, for instance Bob. However, if Bob’s investors leave him and put their money into Alice’s fund, she has fewer people to trade with – meaning she will be able to’t deploy the capital effectively.

Bob’s withdrawals go to Clifton.

And so passive money grows, and energetic managers like Alice and Bob have less and fewer probability of beating the market. As the passive share increases, energetic management becomes increasingly difficult.

No matter how good Alice’s inside information is, her ability to monetize her advantage is proscribed by the variety of suckers she will be able to trade against.

This is where the so-called vicious circle comes into play.

As passive investing increases, energetic investing becomes tougher, which in turn drives extra money into passive funds, making life even harder for energetic managers… and so forth – in a vicious cycle.

Who is Alice?

So how do you notice a nasty hedge fund?

It’s easy. They are those who accept your money.

The real hedge fund giants – names like RenTech, Citadel and Millennium – won’t even allow you to invest.

Why? Because their alpha is capability limited.

These individuals are often not even in a position to increase their very own money.

When you invest with RenTech – which implies you’ve got to work there – you get a profit check every quarter. You cannot leave the cash there for the long run where it grows.

These funds have already eliminated all of the market inefficiencies that their strategy has revealed.

They cannot let just anyone in – the truth is, they need suckers on the opposite side of their business, so why not you.

Don’t be Bob

And finally: Who is Bob?

Bob is anyone who’s willing to underperform for long periods of time without having his money taken away.

For years, this was the worst performing energetic mutual fund manager.

And now it’s increasingly small investors.

Why do you think that hedge funds, prop shops and market makers pay brokers to trade against their retail order flow?

I mean, offer “price improvement” services!

Don’t be Bob.

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